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A B S T R A C T
There is widespread agreement that schooling quality should be a priority in the post-2015 education
agenda, but less agreement on how quality can be enhanced in a cost effective manner. In Uganda,
classroom overcrowding is often considered a critical cause of poor learning outcomes. This paper
investigates how various aspects of classroom composition, including class size and the achievement
distribution of classmates, affect individual learning. Using test score data for over 250,000 children,
such compositional factors are found to be relevant. However, their inﬂuence on learning is not so large
as to justify major standalone policy interventions. Rather, pedagogical changes that support children
with literacy difﬁculties merit particular consideration.
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Education systems in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) face signiﬁcant
challenges. Despite solid progress in expanding access to primary
education, discussions surrounding the post-2015 education
agenda consistently suggest that schooling quality should be a
priority (Filmer et al., 2006; Barrett, 2011). This is substantiated by
a range of evidence. International learning assessments indicate
that SSA countries are concentrated in the lower tail of the cross-
country mean achievement distribution (Altinok et al., 2014). Also,
many children appear to be passing through primary school
without mastering even basic skills (Gove and Cvelich, 2011;
Pritchett et al., 2013). For instance, test scores from East Africa
show that less than one-third of students in third grade are able to
complete a reading assignment at the second grade level (Jones
et al., 2014).
The growing consensus around the need to raise schooling
quality is not matched by agreement regarding how this can be
achieved in a cost effective manner. A popular focus is on the
composition of classrooms, which refers both to the number and
type of pupils in each class. This issue is highly relevant to Uganda
where vociferous concerns have been raised regarding classroom
overcrowding. The country’s current National Development Plan
identiﬁes ‘decongesting’ classrooms as a key intervention to raise
primary school quality and proposes using class size indicators as a
basis for disbursing funds (Republic of Uganda, 2010, p. 220). There
is also controversy regarding the ofﬁcial policy of automatic gradeE-mail address: sam.jones@econ.ku.dk.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2015.11.010
0738-0593/ 2015 UNU-WIDER. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access artic
4.0/).promotion (social promotion), introduced in 2005. This seeks to
reduce classroom congestion, especially in lower grades, mainly
driven by grade retention (repetition). However, as elaborated
below, automatic promotion is not consistently implemented,
revealing a tension between equality and efﬁciency in the
provision of schooling.
International evidence concerning the effect of class composi-
tion on learning is mixed. A range of experimental studies have cast
doubt on the cost effectiveness of adding more teachers or other
inputs to boost learning (Kremer and Holla, 2009; Masino and Ni
no-Zarazu´a, 2015; Evans and Popova, 2015). Even so, ﬁndings
about what works remain somewhat divergent. Some studies show
class size can matter in resource-poor contexts. For example, Case
and Deaton (1999) show that higher pupil–teacher ratios in Black
schools at the end of apartheid were associated with lower rates of
enrolment and lower numeracy test scores. Also, using data from a
range of African countries, Fehrler et al. (2009) ﬁnd negative effects
of class sizes above a threshold of around 60 pupils. These results
are consistent with the idea that school inputs show diminishing
marginal returns (Figlio, 1999); thus, weaker effects found in
resource-rich contexts may arise because they operate on a ﬂatter
portion of the curve.
Brophy (2006) summarizes evidence on grade retention and
argues that its longer run costs exceed short-term beneﬁts.
Focussing on the effects on children held back, various studies from
the USA ﬁnd that repeaters are more likely to drop out and have
lower levels of ﬁnal attainment (Roderick et al., 2005; Manacorda,
2012). Comparable negative effects have been found in SSA
primary schools, where grade repetition is widespread (Ndar-
uhutse, 2008; Glick and Sahn, 2009). These studies question thele under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
1 Due to practical difﬁculties, some districts were not sampled in some rounds.
Sample weights are used throughout to adjust for these differences.
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are not directly informative about automatic promotion. Based on
evidence from Brazil, Koppensteiner (2014) ﬁnds a negative
and signiﬁcant impact of this policy, which he interprets as a
disincentive to higher performance. Recent experiences in the USA,
where some school districts have abolished automatic promotion,
point to beneﬁcial learning impacts of this reform when combined
with intensive remedial education for children at risk of being
retained (Greene and Winters, 2009; McCombs et al., 2009; West,
2012).
Ambiguous ﬁndings regarding grade retention may relate to its
impact on the mix of children in each class. Different intensities of
promotion/retention will vary the age- and achievement-compo-
sition of pupils. Studies of the importance of these kinds of effects
also predominantly come from the USA, reﬂecting both methodo-
logical challenges and data limitations elsewhere (Sacerdote,
2011; Angrist, 2014). Nonetheless, evidence is accumulating that
the distribution of ability (achievement) of one’s classmates may
materially affect individual learning progress (Hoxby, 2000b;
Hoxby and Weingarth, 2006). In Kenya, Duﬂo et al. (2011) analyse
an experiment that involved tracking children into smaller classes
by prior ability. Contrary to concerns that tracking only beneﬁts
high-achieving students, they ﬁnd test score gains across the
distribution of initial ability for those subject to tracking. The
proposed mechanism is that tracking enables teachers to focus
instruction on the median level of ability in the class. In a
complementary study, Lavy et al. (2012) show that a higher
proportion of grade repeaters in Israeli middle- and high-schools
has a negative effect on pedagogical practices and student-teacher
interactions, impairing learning for low-achieving non-retained
pupils in particular.
Existing studies indicate that classroom conditions can be
important for learning outcomes. These issues are highly pertinent
to Uganda (Zuze and Leibbrandt, 2011) and motivate the present
study. The main objective is to examine the relative importance of
different mechanisms through which classroom composition
affects learning outcomes. Speciﬁcally, I examine four dimensions
of class composition: class size, the age-composition of classmates,
the share of low-achieving classmates (in either literacy or
numeracy), and the share of high-achieving classmates. In doing
so, the aim is to undertake a diagnostic and comparative analysis of
the inﬂuence of these factors in order to better understand how
different policy objectives, including those associated with
automatic promotion, might promote learning. In turn, this should
help inform donor policies toward the education sector in Uganda.
By way of structure, Section 2 introduces the Ugandan context
and presents the dataset, including the chosen metrics of class
composition. Section 3 discusses the econometric challenges
involved in identifying the unique contribution of these factors
to learning outcomes. The preferred approach employs a combi-
nation of sibling, cohort, age and grade ﬁxed effects (speciﬁed at
the regional level), plus a full set of individual and sibling controls.
As such, identiﬁcation is drawn from variation in classroom
characteristics between sibs enrolled in different grades within the
same school.
The ﬁndings are presented in Section 4, covering a range of
robustness tests. Principally, they indicate that the achievement
level of classmates has a material inﬂuence on learning outcomes.
While some of this effect is symmetric, high-achievers beneﬁt
disproportionally from the presence of other high-achievers.
However, the share of low-achievers appears to be particularly
detrimental in English literacy and in upper grades of primary
school. The policy implications of the results are discussed in
Section 5. These suggest that, despite the statistical ﬁndings,
standalone modiﬁcations to classroom conditions are unlikely
to add-up to large, cost effective aggregate learning gains.Consequently, government and donors should consider policy
initiatives in other areas. Section 6 concludes.
2. Context and data
Unease regarding education quality in Uganda is not new. Rapid
progress in expanding access to schooling was achieved with the
abolition of primary school fees in 1997 (Deininger, 2003).
However, this has placed a strain on resources. For instance,
Nishimura et al. (2008) note that primary school enrolment
increased by 141% between 1997 and 2004, while the number of
teachers and schools increased by just 41%. Large class sizes,
inadequate infrastructure and poorly educated teachers are
frequently attributed to the policy of Universal Primary Education
(UPE) and are considered by many to be critical drivers of poor
learning outcomes, including low primary completion rates (see
Okuni, 2003; Altinyelken, 2010b; Zuze and Leibbrandt, 2011).
To shed light on these issues, I rely on data collected by the Uwezo
initiative in Uganda over the period 2010–2013. This covers four
separate survey rounds, each of which followed the same format.
The aim of the Uwezo surveys has been to get a detailed picture of
learning outcomes across children in Uganda. As such, the surveys
are representative at both the national and district levels for all
children of school age resident in households at the time of the
survey (aged 6–16). In terms of sample design, in each survey round
twenty enumeration areas (EAs) were randomly selected in each
administrative district.1 Next, in each selected EA, around twenty
households were randomly selected to be interviewed. This involved
asking the household head a short set of simple questions and
recording details of resident children (e.g., age, gender, whether or
not attending school, etc.). Further, in each household, a series of
basic literacy and numeracy tests were administered separately to
each child of school age, whether or not attending school.
The literacy and numeracy tests (the Uwezo tests) are described
in detail in Jones et al. (2014). They were designed by local
education experts in Uganda to reﬂect competencies stipulated in
the national curricula at the Standard 2 level. In other words,
they test skills that should be achieved by the majority of pupils
after completing two years of schooling. The literacy test refers
to competencies in English, which is a dominant language of
instruction and is the language in which all pupils are formally
tested at the end of primary school (see further below). It is an oral
test that evaluates reading skills in order of increasing difﬁculty.
Namely, children are asked to recognise a letter from the English
alphabet, read a word, read a sentence, and read a paragraph
(story). Provided the child is able to read at the story level, she is
asked at least one further question to assess whether she
comprehended the story. The numeracy test also assesses basic
skills in order of increasing difﬁculty. The skills tested are number
recognition, counting, value comparison, and performance of basic
arithmetic with numbers of up to two digits. For each test the child
is given an integer score indicating the highest level achieved.
Three distinctive feature of the Uwezo surveys merit note. First,
they are household- as opposed to school-based. As such, they
often contain observations for multiple children from the same
household. Second, the same Uwezo tests are administered to each
surveyed child, regardless of their age or level of schooling. That is,
the test forms do not vary systematically according to the child’s
characteristics. Third, it follows that since the tests are short
and focus only on basic competencies, there are strong age- and
grade-related differences in outcomes – e.g., both the level and
variance of results vary systematically across pupils enrolled in
different grades.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Set Variable Central Eastern Northern Western National
(a) Overall score (std.) 16.2 17.9 19.0 1.3 4.2
Overall score (grade-std.) 1.2 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.7
English score (grade-std.) 1.4 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.7
Math score (grade-std.) 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.4
(b) Age 10.2 10.5 10.6 10.5 10.4
Grade 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.3
Female (%) 49.0 49.6 47.8 49.9 49.2
Attends private sch. (%) 46.1 20.9 5.5 25.1 26.2
Bonus question (%) 70.4 63.9 67.5 65.3 66.8
Age appropriate (%) 47.9 41.4 35.1 36.7 40.8
Age-grade gap (%) 31.7 34.1 38.6 38.4 35.4
(c) Class size 55.0 85.8 84.2 56.0 67.7
Peers age-grade gap (%) 31.9 34.2 38.8 38.6 35.5
Peers low (%) 38.8 57.3 58.1 47.3 49.7
Peers high (%) 40.9 29.9 29.3 34.0 33.9
(d) Children per hhld. 3.3 3.7 3.4 3.2 3.4
Pupils per EA & grade 6.0 7.8 7.8 6.8 7.0
Total obs. (’000s) 42.7 88.6 68.5 55.1 255.0
Source: author’s calculations from Uwezo surveys, Uganda, rounds 1–4 (pooled).
Note: panels (a) and (b) refer to individual outcomes and characteristics, panel (c) refers to classroom composition metrics, panel (d) indicates sample composition, all ﬁgures
are means.
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grades are of interest from a descriptive point of view. However,
they are likely to complicate any analysis of other determinants of
learning, especially where such determinants also vary across
grades. To address this, and in keeping with other studies (e.g.,
Mazumder, 2011), the raw test scores are transformed prior to
analysis. To do so, I standardize the individual literacy and
numeracy scores separately for each survey round, region (Central,
Eastern, Western and Northern) and grade of enrolment.2 This
means that test scores take a mean of zero and standard deviation
of one for each round-region-grade combination. Next, I add these
(round-region-grade) standardized literacy and numeracy scores,
giving a composite score. Finally, to facilitate interpretation of
results, the composite score is normalized at the national level,
taking an overall mean of zero and standard deviation of one
hundred. The individual standardized English and numeracy
scores are normalized in the same way. Roughly speaking, a one
standard deviation change in a test score corresponds to
movement up/down one competency level.3
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics from the dataset used in
the analysis, disaggregated by region. Panel (a) reports the
composite test score and the English and numeracy scores. The
ﬁrst row reports the sum of the raw English and numeracy scores
normalized at the national level only. This indicates substantive
differences between regions in mean achievement. As shown in the
adjacent rows, these differences are eliminated by the transfor-
mation procedure. The grade- and region-standardized test scores
are not precisely centred on zero, however. This occurs because
certain observations have been removed from the dataset after the
transformation. The removed observations are children out of2 Differences between the four survey rounds are not considered of material
interest due to the short time frame between them. Consequently, the four rounds
are pooled. Nonetheless, the normalization procedure is deployed separately for
each round to mitigate potential bias from level differences in outcomes between
rounds – e.g., due to variation in test difﬁculty. An alternative to standardization by
grade is to standardize by age. However, the focus here is on differences between
pupils conditioning out the speciﬁc effects of grade of enrolment (see Section 3). In
any case, there are no material differences in results if age standardization is used.
3 As described in Jones et al. (2014), the tests can be processed using Item
Response Theory methods to generate a latent achievement score. This is not
pursued here in part because the correlation between derived latent scores and raw
standardized scores is extremely high. Moreover, standardizing by grade is less
straightforward under IRT methods.school and those attending secondary school. These exclusions are
driven by the speciﬁc focus of the present study on classroom
conditions in primary schools.4 Consequently, all results must be
interpreted as being conditional on attending primary school.
Panel (b) of Table 1 reports summary statistics of the children
included in the ﬁnal dataset. Their demographic characteristics are
balanced across regions. Nonetheless, there are systematic
differences in the share of children attending private schools.5
This presents an additional problem since observations of school
conditions, namely class size, are only available for government
schools (see below). Excluding these observations would provoke a
signiﬁcant reduction in the number of observations and potentially
yield a selective sample. Rather than do so, the metrics of
classroom conditions and composition are based on observations
of all children attending a given grade in the same EA, regardless of
the school attended. While this is a drawback, observed conditions
in many non-government schools are not so different to those of
government schools. In part this is because many private schools
are of a low cost variety. The World Bank’s Service Delivery
Indicators series, for example, indicates a lower availability of
textbooks and other physical teaching infrastructure in private
schools in Uganda, but slightly higher teacher–pupil ratios (Wane
and Martin, 2013). In addition, the regression models described in
Section 3 include a range of covariates at the child, peer and sibling
levels that seek to control for individual inﬂuences on learning,
including schooling choices (e.g., public vs private).
Elaborating on class composition, in each EA the Uwezo teams
surveyed a single randomly pre-selected local government
primary school.6 This included a headcount of pupils attending
school in a given grade and classroom on the survey day, which
gives the class size indicator reported in panel (c) of Table 1.7 Class
size is conceptually distinct from the pupil–teacher ratio. I focus on4 Class size data is only available for primary schools and cannot be very
meaningfully attributed to children out of school.
5 For present purposes, private schools include those run by non-governmental
organizations.
6 In many cases only one school was available and was selected by default.
7 In larger schools, some streams can be taught in the same classroom (at the
same time). However, in principle, these are separated in the dataset. That is, the
class size metric is the headcount of children in a selected stream and grade in a
given classroom. The school data does not include information on teacher
characteristics per grade.
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information for class sizes; in contrast, the pupil-teacher ratio can
only be calculated as a school-wide average. However, and
particularly in low-income contexts where teacher absenteeism
is a chronic problem (Chaudhury et al., 2006), the ofﬁcial pupil–
teacher ratio may be misleading because it typically includes
teachers that are (frequently) absent from class or who primarily
undertake administrative duties.
Previous studies have raised concerns about slow rates of
progress through primary school in Uganda (Jones et al., 2014).
To capture this, I identify which children are age-appropriate for
the grade in which they are enrolled. An age-appropriate child is
deﬁned as one who starts school at the correct age or younger
(six) and progresses by one grade each school year. Thus, a nine
year old child enrolled in grade four is age-appropriate.8
According to this deﬁnition, around 41% of children attending
primary school are age-appropriate (see Table 1). This is not
driven by a large share of children initially delaying school entry.
As illustrated in Appendix Fig. A1, around 80% of children aged
six are enrolled in primary school. Even so, conditional on being
enrolled, just half of pupils aged eight are age-appropriate for
their grade.
A complementary metric is the gap between a child’s age and
grade of enrolment. Normalized by age, this is calculated for child i
attending grade k as follows:
Gapik ¼ 1
k
Agei5
(1)
Since the denominator on the RHS is the child’s expected grade if
she had entered school at age six and continued without repetition,
the measure gives the relative intensity by which a given child’s
progress is delayed, ranging from zero to one. According to the
data, the mean rate of delay is approximately 35% (see Table 1b),
suggesting a high prevalence of grade repetition across Ugandan
primary schools.9 This is found despite the ofﬁcial policy of
automatic promotion (AP). Indeed, resistance to AP on the part of
both teachers and parents is widely documented. One author
quotes a parent: ‘‘children. . . can neither read nor write their
names, yet they keep on being promoted to higher classes. UPE
promotes failures, for example, a child who scores 80 marks out of
400 can take the 12th position out of 600 pupils. These are all
failures and yet they are promoted to the next class.’’ (Okuni, 2003,
p. 34).10
The uneven application of AP hints that other pedagogical
challenges associated with class composition may be material.
These include dealing with pupils of widely different ages and/or
achievement levels in the same classroom. As noted in Section 1,
existing literature suggests these dynamics may inﬂuence learning
outcomes. To get a handle on these, three additional metrics are
calculated from the observed characteristics of the children
surveyed by Uwezo. To avoid direct conﬂation of any one
individuals’ characteristics with the group mean, these measures
are calculated excluding the individual to whom the observation
applies. As such, the focus is on how the composition of one’s8 To avoid mis-classiﬁcation of younger/older children on account of the speciﬁc
date of their birthday, only children more than one year too old for their grade are
deemed to be age-inappropriate.
9 More precisely, the metric described by Eq. (1) provides a general proxy for
various effects: grade repetition, delayed enrolment and interrupted schooling.
None of these effects are captured directly in the survey. Delayed progress also is
not unique to government primary schools – e.g., only 48% of private pupils are age-
appropriate.
10 Similarly, a report on budget support to the education sector notes that: ‘‘The
policy of automatic promotion is indicative of the priority given to access over
quality in primary education following the introduction of UPE.’’ (Hedger et al.,
2010, p. 26).classmates, deﬁned as children enrolled in the same grade in the
same location, inﬂuences individual outcomes.
To capture the extent to which children are affected by the
proportion and intensity of ‘repeaters’ in the class, I calculate her
classmates’ mean delay rate (age-grade gap):
Gapikl ¼ ðjPlkj1Þ1
X
j 2 Plk
GapjklGapikl
0
@
1
A (2)
where Plk is the set of all children observed in location l at grade
k. To capture the inﬂuence of the achievement proﬁle of one’s
classmates, I use the share of peers lying above or below speciﬁc
absolute competency thresholds on the Uwezo tests. Speciﬁcally, I
calculate the share of peers unable to either read a word in English
or recognise two digit numbers (denoted ‘low’); and the share
attaining the highest competency on either of tests (denoted
‘high’). These are calculated in the same leave-one-out fashion as
Eq. (2). When included in the empirical speciﬁcation (see below),
they imply a non-linear relationship between individual outcomes
and classmates’ test scores. This means that such effects can be
identiﬁed, in principle (Blume et al., 2011).
Panel (c) of Table 1 reports regional and national means for
these classroom composition (peer) effects.11 The measures of
achievement suggest signiﬁcant variation in competencies. Im-
portantly, such variation is found within individual classes. To
show this, it is instructive to calculate the share of classes (grades
and locations) where the share of low- and high-achieving children
is both simultaneously larger than the remaining share of pupils in
the class. Crudely, such classes display a bi-modal achievement
proﬁle. As illustrated in Appendix Fig. A2, this phenomenon is
prevalent in all grades but especially in the middle of primary
school – e.g., more than 38% of all grade four classes show a bi-
modal achievement pattern. Superﬁcially, this gives credence to
concerns regarding class composition in Uganda.
3. Empirical strategy
This section describes the empirical strategy which seeks to link
the class composition metrics to learning outcomes. The main
approach is summarized by the following speciﬁcation:
tijklm ¼ Z0ib þ P¯
0
ikld þ uj þ g l þ fkm þ
X16
n¼6
lmn1ðAgei
¼ nÞ þ ðei þ hklÞ (3)
The dependent variable t is the composite test score standardized
by grade and region. The subscripts index child i, resident in
household j, enrolled in grade k in locality (EA) l of region m. The
model includes two main sets of control variates. These refer to the
characteristics of the child (Zi) and the characteristics of her local
grade-cohort (P¯ikl), as deﬁned above. A comprehensive range of
ﬁxed effects also are included. Respectively, these absorb time
invariant unobserved characteristics for each unique household,
location, region-grade and region-age combination. Residual error
is given by the ﬁnal two terms in parentheses. These capture
unobserved individual heterogeneity and remaining idiosyncratic
location-grade effects (discussed below).
The coefﬁcients of interest are represented by the vector d. In
the preferred speciﬁcation these are identiﬁed from variation in
classroom characteristics between sibs, after controlling for child-
speciﬁc observed characteristics and other ﬁxed effects. Since
approximately 90% of all sibs in the dataset attend the11 The term peer effect is used here as a shorthand for effects related to the
composition of one’s classmates. This is not to claim these effects are uniquely
attributable to peer interactions; rather, they may be associated with changes in
teacher behaviour.
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addressed through inclusion of the sibling ﬁxed effects term
uj.
12 Effectively, therefore, identiﬁcation is drawn from idiosyn-
cratic variation in peer characteristics found within schools and
between sibs enrolled in different grades, which is the norm due to
sib age differences. Moreover, as all ﬁxed effects associated with
age and grade (in each region) enter the model, systematic
between-grade and between-age effects are expunged and do not
affect estimates of d.
The above strategy is similar to other studies in the literature
that rely on extensive sets of ﬁxed effects to isolate variation in
cohort/class composition within well-deﬁned units (Hoxby,
2000a; Carrell and Hoekstra, 2010; Neidell and Waldfogel, 2010;
Sacerdote, 2011). For instance, Carrell et al. (2008) use both
academy and cohort ﬁxed effects to investigate peer effects in
academic cheating. Most similar to the present study is Lavy et al.
(2012), who use school and time ﬁxed effects to isolate the effect of
variation in the share of repeaters within schools over time on
individual test outcomes. As these authors note, the advantage of
using school (and sibling) ﬁxed effects is that they address the
potential issue of endogenous selection of households into
locations and local schools.
Inclusion of the above sets of ﬁxed effects does not address all
potential estimation challenges. For instance, a child’s peer group
may be endogenous to the extent that this is manipulated across
sibs in the same household – e.g., via sib-selective grade retention,
delaying school entry or choosing different schools on an
individual basis. However, many households exercise limited
effective choice over schools conditional on their location. Also,
primary school classes in Uganda tend to be large and contain a
wide range of students (due to prevalent repetition). Thus, the
scope for manipulation is unlikely to be very large. Even so, to
assuage this concern, a full set of child-speciﬁc controls are
included in the model (Z). These include the child’s gender, her
birth order, whether she attends private school (see Section 2) and
whether the child correctly answered a ‘bonus’ everyday general
knowledge question included in the Uwezo surveys. These are
intended to capture unobserved individual abilities or aspects of
intra-household resource allocation decisions that may be
correlated with endogenously chosen peer characteristics.
A further challenge is that the characteristics of siblings and
peers may be confounded. Trivially, this can occur when sibs
attend the same grade as the child of interest, forming part of her
peer group. To address this, I verify that the results remain robust
to removal of all sibs who attend the same grade. In addition, and
as an extension to the baseline model, I add controls for the
characteristics and outcomes of the next oldest sibling. Following
Williams and Gregory (2001), among others, the logic is that older
sibs can exert an important inﬂuence on the educational outcomes
of younger children, while the reverse channel tends to be weaker.
This approach has been employed elsewhere since it mitigates the
problem of reﬂection between sibs in outcomes (e.g., Nicoletti and
Rabe, 2014).
Garces et al. (2002) discuss the merits of household ﬁxed effects
in a similar setting. One disadvantage is that the effective sample
size falls, as households with just one child are excluded.
Additionally, the relative impact of measurement error can
increase dramatically, often yielding coefﬁcient estimates that
are signiﬁcantly downward biased (Ashenfelter and Krueger,
1994). One strategy to address this is to ﬁnd valid and relevant
instrumental variables for the covariates of interest – namely, the12 The Uwezo data does not provide a means to identify the school each surveyed
child attends. However, we can identify whether the child attends the same school
covered in the school survey. Of all children resident in households containing at
least one child attending the latter school, less than 7% attend a different school.class size and peer effects. In a large observational data set of the
sort here, this is problematic. As an alternative, I estimate and
compare results using both sibling ﬁxed effects and sibling
difference models.13 If measurement error is negligible, these
estimates should be highly comparable. However, if measurement
error is material and there is substantial persistence in the true
values of the covariates across sibs, then we should expect the ﬁrst
difference results to be much more attenuated (Griliches and
Hausman, 1986; McKinnish, 2008).
A related concern is that the peer effects are calculated from a
sample rather than an enumeration of all students in each grade
and location. As Ammermueller and Pischke (2006) show, this
mechanically generates attenuation bias that is approximately on
the order of: (nkl  1)/(Nkl  1), where nkl is the sampled number of
observations in each school (location) and grade; and Nkl is the
total. According to the statistics in panel (d) of Table 1, there are
approximately seven observations per location-grade; thus, the
estimates of d may be just 0.1 of their correct values. However, this
calculation is only valid in the absence of bias from unobserved
grade-location effects, given by the ﬁnal term in Eq. (3). These may
capture local shocks to speciﬁc age or grade cohorts; and/or
idiosyncratic variation in teacher quality within schools (locations).
To limit this, the vector P¯ikl encompasses both the class composition
effects and a range of other peer characteristics, including their age,
gender composition, answers to the bonus question, and family
background characteristics. Standard errors also are calculated to
adjust for clustering at the location (EA) level in all estimations.
Nonetheless, and despite running various robustness tests, I cannot
completely exclude the possibility that estimated peer effects reﬂect
some such unobserved clustering of outcomes among students in
the same grade and location (as per Angrist, 2014).
Lastly, the speciﬁcation given by Eq. (3) assumes classroom peer
effects are symmetric. That is, the effect on child i of the presence of
low- (high-) achieving classmates does not vary according to the
characteristics of that child. As elaborated in Section 5, the
existence of asymmetric effects is of particular interest from a
policy perspective. To test for the latter, I extend the model and
interact the two peer achievement outcome measures with the
dummy variable for child is general knowledge (bonus) question,
which is a proxy for ability. If either of these interaction terms is
signiﬁcantly different from zero, then the null hypothesis of
symmetric effects can be rejected.
4. Results
4.1. Baseline model
Tables 2 and 3 summarize key results from the baseline model.
Since we do not observe the same household in multiple locations
(e.g., over time), location ﬁxed effects at any level are nested within
the household ﬁxed effects and cannot be estimated separately.
Thus, Table 2 only includes location ﬁxed effects speciﬁed at the
EA-level, which is the same level at which grade cohorts are
identiﬁed for calculation of the peer effects (Eq. (2)). To address
household factors, this model includes a number of observed
household characteristics – e.g., socio-economic status, mother’s
education, age of head of household, and household demographics.
These controls become superﬂuous in Table 3, which employs
household (sibling) effects. In panel (a) shared sibling effects are
removed via a within-transformation; in panel (b) they are
removed by differencing, which explains the reduction in number
of observations.1413 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing toward this strategy.
14 To avoid any bias that may arise when differencing pairs of siblings at speciﬁc
birth orders, the sibs are ordered randomly before the ﬁrst differencing procedure.
Table 2
Estimates with location (EA) ﬁxed effects.
I II III IV V VI
Bonus question 69.70*** 69.39*** 68.24*** 69.05*** 65.02*** 63.17***
(1.07) (1.07) (2.51) (2.51) (3.12) (3.02)
Age-grade gap (%) 0.74*** 0.73*** 0.74*** 0.75*** 0.27*** 0.25***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Class size (log.) 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Peers age-grade gap (%) 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Peers low (%) 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.08**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Peers high (%) 0.23*** 0.03 0.06 0.10** 0.07*
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Bonus  Peers low (%) 0.07** 0.06** 0.07** 0.06*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Bonus  Peers high (%) 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.31***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Sib: class size (log.) 0.02**
(0.01)
Sib: age-grade gap (%) 0.19***
(0.05)
Sib: low 25.45***
(1.01)
Sib: high 22.41***
(0.98)
N 251,238 251,238 251,238 251,238 147,940 141,463
R2 adj. 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15
RMSE 82.27 82.12 82.04 81.98 79.68 78.28
Symmetry – – 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Peer chars.? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Older sib chars.? No No No No Yes Yes
Older sib outcomes? No No No No No Yes
Note: dependent variable is the standardized composite test score; all speciﬁcations include EA ﬁxed effects, child and household controls (not shown); column III adds
average peer characteristics (e.g., age, gender); column V adds next oldest sib characteristics; and column VI adds next oldest sib outcomes, as shown; ‘Symmetry’ tests joint
signiﬁcance of interaction terms; standard errors are clustered at the EA level.
* Signiﬁcance: 10%.
** Signiﬁcance: 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance: 1%.
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(II) enter separate sets of the class composition variables; column
(III) includes both the achievement effects and interactions with
the individual ability proxy; and in column (VI) all composition
effects are entered jointly together with other peer character-
istics. In column (VII), the characteristics of the next oldest sibling
(her age, grade, gender, whether attending private school,
whether overage for grade and if she answered the general
knowledge question correctly) are added. Lastly, column (VIII)
includes additional outcomes of the oldest sib – namely, her age-
grade gap (in percent), her class size, and whether she is a low- or
high-achiever (as deﬁned previously). These are the same
variables used to calculate the class composition metrics.
Consequently, the estimates in the ﬁnal column of Table 3 of
the (peer) class composition effects are conditional both on
conditions shared by all sibs and the characteristics/outcomes of
the next oldest sib.
What do we learn from the results? The ﬁrst two rows of Table 2
refer to characteristics of child i. The bonus question shows a large
positive and signiﬁcant relationship with the composite test score,
supporting its interpretation as a proxy for individual ability. The
coefﬁcient on the age-grade gap (delay intensity) is negative,15 Only selected coefﬁcients are shown in each table. Full results are available
from the author on request. Appendix Table A1 reports additional selected
coefﬁcients from the estimates summarized in Tables 2 and 3.suggesting that delayed progress is associated with signiﬁcantly
lower test score outcomes even after controlling for grade
attainment (see also Appendix Table A1). Whilst this ﬁnding is
broadly consistent with previous literature regarding the effects
of delayed grade progression, the present estimate may not be
strictly causal. This is because there may be residual correlation
between the age-grade gap and unobserved aspects of individual
heterogeneity (ei in Eq. (3)).
Turning to the class composition variables, there is no
systematic learning impact associated with the extent to which
one’s classmates have delayed their progress (are overage for
grade). In itself, therefore, multi-age classrooms do not appear to
either accelerate or hold-back learning, holding other aspects of
class composition constant. Class size, on the other hand, is
associated with a signiﬁcant negative effect on learning. The
magnitude of this impact, however, is small. Cutting class sizes in
half is associated with a test score gain of approximately 3% of a
standard deviation per affected pupil (Table 3a, column IV).
In line with previous studies, the achievement-composition of
one’s classmates affects individual learning outcomes. These
effects run in the expected directions and are material. According
to column II of Table 3a, cutting the share of low-achieving
classmates from one hundred percent to zero is associated with an
increase in child i’s test score of around 19% of a standard deviation
(19 points). Increasing the share of high-achieving classmates from
zero to one is associated with test score gains of around 27 points.
Table 3
Sibling ﬁxed effects and sibling difference estimates.
I II III IV V VI
(a) Sibling ﬁxed effects
Class size (log.) 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Peers age-grade gap (%) 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Peers low (%) 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.19***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Peers high (%) 0.27*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.15***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Bonus  Peers low (%) 0.07** 0.06* 0.05 0.06*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Bonus  Peers high (%) 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.17***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
N 231,633 231,633 231,633 231,633 150,113 143,581
Symmetry – – 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(b) Sibling differences
Class size (log.) 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Peers age-grade gap (%) 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Peers low (%) 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.23***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Peers high (%) 0.27*** 0.08** 0.12*** 0.14** 0.16***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Bonus  Peers low (%) 0.07** 0.06* 0.03 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Bonus  Peers high (%) 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.17**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
N 147,543 147,543 147,543 147,543 58,855 52,946
Symmetry – – 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Peer chars.? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Older sib chars.? No No No No Yes Yes
Older sib outcomes? No No No No No Yes
Note: dependent variable is the standardized composite test score; speciﬁcations in panel (a) include household ﬁxed effects; panel (b) is calculated from sibling differences;
control variables are as per Table 2 but exclude household controls; only selected coefﬁcients shown; standard errors are clustered at the EA level.
* Signiﬁcance: 10%.
** Signiﬁcance: 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance: 1%.
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average results. As indicated in the footer of the tables, the null
hypothesis of symmetric effects is rejected for all models.16
Rather, the achievement effects are asymmetric; speciﬁcally,
they are larger in magnitude for higher ability students, proxied
by a correct answer to the bonus question (included separately
in the model). Moreover, this effect is strongest and most robust
in a positive direction – i.e., higher-ability students beneﬁt more
from the presence of high-achieving classmates versus
students unable to answer the bonus question. Using the
classiﬁcation of Hoxby (2000b), this is consistent with a single
crossing structure to the achievement effects. Other structures,
such as the bad apple model, are generally not supported
given that the (non-interacted) high and low achievement
effects tend to offset each other.
Three additional points are worth noting. First, focussing on the
estimated magnitudes of the coefﬁcients of interest, there are
relatively minor differences between Tables 2 and 3. This indicates
that bias from omitted household factors is likely to be small,
possibly due to substantial residential segregation of households
and/or minimal scope for choice of schooling within each location.
Second, the sibling ﬁxed effects and difference speciﬁcations in16 The footer line ‘Symmetry’ reports the probability that the two interaction
terms are jointly equal to zero.Table 3 are extremely similar. This provides conﬁdence that
measurement error is unlikely to severely bias the results. Third,
once shared sibling effects are included, inclusion of older sib
controls (columns V and VI) makes only small differences to the
estimates of interest. Given these latter speciﬁcations naturally
restrict the sample, in some cases substantially, the results of the
next section rely mainly on the speciﬁcations represented by
column IV of Table 3.
4.2. Robustness
To verify the robustness of the results, I proceed in three steps.
First, I run a falsiﬁcation test in which the four class composition
effects are shufﬂed randomly across children in each location
(EA). This aims to conﬁrm whether such effects are genuinely
driven by grade- and cohort-speciﬁc factors in each location.
Findings from this procedure are reported in Table 4. Columns I to
III repeat the baseline model from Section 4.1, incorporating EA
ﬁxed effects, sib ﬁxed effects (FE) and sib differences (FD)
respectively. Columns IV to VI add the full set of older sib controls.
In all cases, only the class composition variables have been
shufﬂed, not other peer or individual characteristics.17 As the
table shows, the various coefﬁcient estimates are no longer17 The ‘bonus’ interaction terms are recalculated after the shufﬂing process.
Table 5
Competency-speciﬁc robustness.
English Math
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Class size (log.) 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04** 0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Peers age-grade gap (%) 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Peers low (%) 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.05 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Peers high (%) 0.02 0.00 0.07* 0.07* 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Bonus  Peers low (%) 0.06* 0.06* 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Bonus  Peers high (%) 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.09** 0.11** 0.00 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Math score (grade-std.) 0.38*** 0.38***
(0.01) (0.01)
English score (grade-std.) 0.38*** 0.38***
(0.01) (0.01)
N 231,633 147,543 147,543 147,543 231,633 147,543 231,633 147,543
R2 adj. 0.09 0.09 0.22 0.22 0.10 0.10 0.22 0.23
RMSE 62.58 112.01 103.74 103.74 62.72 112.52 58.08 104.21
Symmetry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.50
Speciﬁcation FE FD FE FD FE FD FE FD
Note: dependent variable is the standardized test score for the indicated subject test; all speciﬁcations follow column IV of Table 3; FE indicates ﬁxed effects; FD indicates
sibling differences; columns III, IV, VII, VIII add the child’s outcome on the excluded subject test; only selected coefﬁcients shown; standard errors are clustered at the EA level.
* Signiﬁcance: 10%.
** Signiﬁcance: 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance: 1%.
Table 4
Falsiﬁcation tests.
I II III IV V VI
Class size (log.) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Peers age-grade gap (%) 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.09* 0.00 0.09
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Peers low (%) 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Peers high (%) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Bonus  Peers low (%) 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Bonus  Peers high (%) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
N 231,633 147,543 150,113 58,855 143,581 52,946
Symmetry 0.85 0.99 0.35 0.49 0.50 0.71
Speciﬁcation FE FE FD FE FE FD
Effect level EA Sibs Sibs EA Sibs Sibs
Older sib controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Note: dependent variable is the standardized composite test score; class composition metrics (shown) are shufﬂed across grades within each location (EA); FE indicates ﬁxed
effects; FD indicates sibling differences; column I follows the speciﬁcation in Table 2, column IV; columns II and III follow Table 3 column IV (panels a and b); columns IV–VI
follow column VI of the same tables; only selected coefﬁcients shown; standard errors are clustered at the EA level.
* Signiﬁcance: 10%.
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ﬁndings were not spurious and do capture systematic within-
location class composition effects.18
Second, I verify whether the results apply to the separate
literacy and numeracy competency tests that constitute the
composite score. These ﬁndings are reported in Table 5, again in18 Similar results are found using alternative falsiﬁcation tests, such as shufﬂing
the peer effects across grades or ages within districts. Results available on request.summary form. Columns I to IV refer to the English test
(standardized by grade and region); columns V to VIII refer to
the numeracy test. Columns I and II (V and VI) employ the baseline
speciﬁcations with sibling ﬁxed effects and sib differences.
Columns III and IV (VII and VIII) include child i’s score on the
omitted test as an additional covariate, thereby further controlling
for omitted individual ability.
Two main ﬁndings emerge from these estimates. First, class size
effects are larger and have a more robust impact on literacy as
Table 6
Artiﬁcial regression estimates for speciﬁc grades and school types.
Grades 1–4 Grades 5–7 Matched school
I II III IV V VI
Class size (log.) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Peers age-grade gap (%) 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Peers low (%) 0.03 0.04 0.09* 0.11* 0.00 0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Peers high (%) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Bonus  Peers low (%) 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Bonus  Peers high (%) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
N 165,575 104,484 66,058 43,059 127,976 81,159
Symmetry 0.96 0.88 0.68 0.84 0.73 0.76
Speciﬁcation FE FD FE FD FE FD
Note: dependent variable is the estimated residual from column IV of Table 3, from which the speciﬁcation is also taken; FE indicates sibling ﬁxed effects; FD indicates sibling
differences; columns are restricted samples, indicated in the header; only selected coefﬁcients shown; standard errors are clustered at the EA level.
* Signiﬁcance: 10%.
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included as a control, class size no longer has a signiﬁcant effect on
her maths test score (columns VII and VIII). Second, the structure of
peer achievement effects differs across tests. In English, there
appears most support for a bad apple model – the negative effect of
low-achievers is more pronounced than the positive effect from
high-achievers. However, in numeracy the opposite (shining light)
model receives greater support. Furthermore, the asymmetrical
single crossing effect is most pronounced in English as opposed to
numeracy. I reﬂect on these ﬁndings in Section 5.
Lastly, I verify whether the results are systematically different
across sub-samples. To do so, I run artiﬁcial (Gauss–Newton)
regressions, in which the dependent variable is the residual from
the relevant baseline model estimated in Section 4.1 and the RHS
repeats the baseline speciﬁcation, the only difference being that
this model is estimated on a restricted sample.19 An artiﬁcial
regression approach is suitable here since it provides a direct test
of the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcient estimates for the sub-
sample are the same as in the pooled regression. If this is the case,
the artiﬁcial regression coefﬁcient estimates will not be different
from zero.
Table 6 investigates differences in coefﬁcients between lower
(columns I and II) and upper (III and IV) primary school grades. In
addition, columns V and VI restrict the sample to children directly
matched to the speciﬁc primary school surveyed by the Uwezo
teams and from which class sizes are estimated. All models use
either sibling ﬁxed effect or difference speciﬁcations. The new
ﬁnding here is that the negative effect of the share of low
performing peers is larger in upper primary school. This is likely to
be capturing the fact that many (rural) primary schools transition
from teaching in a local language to teaching in English during
grade 4 (Ssentanda, 2014). Thus, weak English literacy may be
especially problematic in later grades.
Appendix Table A2 considers other sub-samples. Columns I and
II exclude sibs that attend the same grade. Columns III and IV
exclude peer groups for which there are either less than seven
available observations in the sample or fewer than 30 pupils
observed in the class (by headcount). The remaining columns
consider speciﬁc regions. These sample restrictions provide no
reason to doubt the general validity of the main results. Estimates19 For a detailed overview of this method see MacKinnon (1992).from columns III and IV provide some evidence to suggest that the
ability peer effects are indeed somewhat attenuated (as expected,
see Section 3). However, these differences are only borderline
signiﬁcant.
5. Implications
Three main ﬁndings emerged from the previous section.
Namely: (i) a small negative effect of class size on learning, (ii)
no effect of the share of class mates who are over age for grade, and
(iii) moderate effects of their ability distribution. Results of these
magnitudes are plausible and broadly in line with previous studies.
However, effect sizes usually cannot provide direct policy
guidance, especially in terms of cost effectiveness. For instance,
class size reductions may be prohibitively expensive and difﬁcult
to implement on a large scale (Bold et al., 2013). Also, aside from
the cost implications, signiﬁcant increases in the number of
teachers is likely to come up against supply-side constraints. So, in
light of the modest effect size of the present results, pursuit of
signiﬁcant widespread class size reductions in Uganda is unlikely
to be a cost effective policy.
The existence of achievement-related classroom effects might
be taken to imply that learning gains can be achieved at low cost by
shifting pupils across classes or grades. However, as Hoxby (2000b)
makes clear, this depends on the particular structure of the
achievement effects. Where they are symmetrical and homoge-
neous across grades, no aggregate learning gains can be achieved
via policies such as automatic promotion or grade retention. The
reason is that higher ability children pull-up the outcomes of other
children, while lower ability children do the opposite. Different
policies toward promotion/retention can alter the variance of
outcomes, but they cannot generate any change in mean learning
levels across all pupils.
Asymmetrical achievement effects can point to different
conclusions. For instance, in a basic single crossing model where
only high-achieving peers beneﬁt from the presence of (other)
high achievers, average learning gains can be achieved by
redistributing children across classes. Appendix Table A3 uses
the earlier regression results, which support single crossing, to
quantify the magnitude of learning differences associated with
the two policies of grade retention and automatic promotion. The
policy scenarios described in the table contemplate a single cohort
S. Jones / International Journal of Educational Development 48 (2016) 66–78 75of students, containing equal numbers of low- and high-achievers,
moving from grade 1 to 2. Under automatic promotion (panel (a))
all members of this cohort transition to grade 2. Under grade
retention (panel (b)), only the high-achievers move on. Interest
focuses on the learning effects after transition, thereby taking into
account any effect on the new entrants in grade 1 who are assumed
to be identical to the previous cohort.
The policy scenarios only allow a peer effect running from
high-achievers to other high-achievers. Following Table 3b, this
is equal to dH = 20 (any symmetric effects are ignored).
20 The
mean difference in outcomes between the two scenarios is
reported in the ﬁnal row. This suggests a per-pupil average gain
of just 1.7 points if low-achievers are retained rather than
promoted. Similar calculations can be undertaken to compare
policies where peer effects differ between grades (see Table 6).
These lead to the same conclusion: even if achievement
effects were signiﬁcantly underestimated, it is difﬁcult to see
how the redistribution of pupils between classes (grades) could
plausibly add-up to large aggregate learning effects under
existing resources.
The upshot of the above is that the effective difference between
automatic promotion and retention appears small. Put another
way, holding other inputs constant, reforms in this domain are
unlikely to be fundamental to improving aggregate learning
outcomes.21 This is supported by the ﬁnding that achievement
effects differ across subjects (see Table 6), which logically makes
the design of optimal retention policies even more difﬁcult. Where
does this leave us? One implication is that policies aiming to alter
class composition are unlikely to be particularly cost effective
when implemented on a large scale. That said, it may be reasonable
to target and combine such interventions in very speciﬁc contexts.
For instance, in exceptionally large classes where the distribution
of achievement is bimodal, it may be justiﬁed to cut class sizes and
instigate some form of achievement-tracking. Using the same
arithmetic as before, and assuming only single crossing, students
tracked into high/lower streams could gain (around) 5 points on
average from tracking plus an additional beneﬁt from a smaller
class.22
A second implication is that it may be more valuable to look
beyond class composition to raise learning outcomes. The previous
estimates indicated that the presence of low-achievers in the class
exerts a damaging effect on all students. For the composite test
score this is offset by the presence of high-achievers; however, the
results for (English) literacy suggest that a ‘bad apple’ effect
predominates. Moreover, these effects are aggravated in upper
primary school, when the transition to English instruction should
be complete. This suggests a role for intensive support to basic
literacy in early-middle primary school. Various options here merit
consideration. Pritchett and Beatty (2012) suggest that over-
ambitious curricula, with diffuse learning goals, contribute to the
emergence of learning gaps in primary school (also Spaull and
Kotze, 2015). This concern appears relevant to Uganda, despite the
introduction of a new (thematic) curriculum in 2007. For example,
Altinyelken (2010a) argues that the new curriculum is extremely
broad and places unrealistic demands on primary school teachers.
In addition, due to the speciﬁc challenges associated with the
transition to English in upper primary school, children may20 The average test score contribution, in any given class, associated with peer
effects for high-achievers can be approximated as: dHp2H , where pH is the share of
high-achievers.
21 These estimates ignore class size effects, as well as individual effects associated
with delayed progression. If both of these are material and negative (in a causal
sense), then these would offset even the small beneﬁts associated with grade
retention.
22 Recall from Section 3 that estimates of these achievement effects may well be
downward biased as they are calculated from a sample.display different learning speeds across subjects. This reinforces
the need to focus early schooling explicitly on the acquisition of
a limited set of core skills, rather than knowledge of a broad
range of subjects. It also highlights the importance of supporting
a good ﬁt between each child and the level of instruction received
in each subject. While this is not easy to achieve, evidence from a
range of contexts suggests that intensive remedial education and
changes to pedagogical techniques can make a critical difference
(McCombs et al., 2009; Gove and Cvelich, 2011; Lucas et al., 2014;
Evans and Popova, 2015). Effective policies in this domain are
unlikely to be formulaic and will require both innovation and
experimentation. This is where foreign aid donors can act as
supportive partners, providing the ﬁnance and technical exper-
tise to explore new policy ideas.
6. Conclusion
This study began by noting widespread agreement around the
need to raise schooling quality across the developing world.
Despite this, there is less consensus on how improvements can be
achieved in a cost effective manner. In Uganda, these concerns are
highly pertinent. Moreover, they have prompted renewed
emphasis on reforms to aspects of class composition, such as
the quantity and type of students in each class, in order to raise
learning outcomes. This paper therefore sought to rigorously
quantify the relative importance of a range of class composition
effects for individual learning outcomes. These effects included
class size, the share of overage-for-grade children, and the
achievement distribution of one’s classmates (shares of low- and
high-achievers).
The analysis used a dataset covering over 250,000 Ugandan
children from all districts of the country. In addition to containing
test scores on basic competencies in numeracy and English
literacy, the dataset included observations from multiple children
in the same household, who are often attending the same primary
school. In the econometric analysis, this allowed sibling ﬁxed
effects and sibling differences to be incorporated in the speciﬁca-
tion. As such, identiﬁcation was gained from variation in class
composition between siblings across grades within the same
location (school). This approach addresses a wide range of
potential concerns regarding omitted variables bias; and the
ﬁndings were corroborated by various robustness tests. Even so, as
is often the case with observational data, scope for bias remains
and the results should be interpreted with due caution.
Three main ﬁndings emerged from the analysis. Namely there
are: (i) small negative effects of class size, (ii) no systematic effects
of sharing a class with a larger share of children who are overage-
for-grade (delayed school progress), and (iii) material achievement
effects. The latter encompassed both a negative effect of having a
higher share of low-achievers in the same grade; and a positive
effect of a higher share of high-achievers. For the composite test
score, these two effects were symmetric and largely offsetting.
Nonetheless, they varied between academic subjects – in English
the negative effect of low-achievers was predominant. Moreover,
the negative effect of low-achievers appeared larger in upper
primary school. Lastly, there was evidence that higher-ability
children beneﬁt more from the presence of other high-achievers,
which is consistent with a single crossing structure to the
achievement effects.
These statistically signiﬁcant ﬁndings do not point to speciﬁc
policy reforms. In fact, the arithmetic of achievement effects
suggests that any simple rearrangement of pupils across classes is
unlikely to deliver large aggregate (average) learning gains.
Similarly, class size reductions do not appear to be a cost effective
general solution. Consequently, the focus on broad class composi-
tion targets, currently emphasised in government policy, is
S. Jones / International Journal of Educational Development 48 (2016) 66–7876unlikely to deliver large learning gains. Rather, concrete measures
to support under-performing children and schools are required.
The ﬁndings indicated that support to children in (English) literacy
acquisition before they transition to upper primary school may be
particularly important. The wider point is that government andTable A1
Detailed regression models for overall test score.
I II 
Female 0.93 1.10 
(0.63) (0.71) 
Age appropriate 4.17*** 4.04***
(1.22) (1.32) 
Attends private school 24.67*** 25.16***
(1.57) (1.72) 
Bonus question 63.72*** 62.23***
(2.95) (3.14) 
Birth order (rel.) 16.48*** 14.76***
(3.44) (3.88) 
Peers general know. (%) 0.15*** 0.15***
(0.02) (0.02) 
Sib: age app. 1.26 
(1.46) 
Sib: age 1.12***
(0.42) 
Sib: female 0.37 
(0.84) 
Sib: private 1.94 
(1.70) 
Sib: grade 1.09**
(0.46) 
Sib: bonus qu. 0.19 
(1.25) 
Sib: class size (log.) 
Sib: age-grade gap (%) 
Sib: low 
Sib: high 
N 231,633 150,113 
Symmetry 0.00 0.00 
Speciﬁcation FE FE 
Older sib chars.? No Yes 
Older sib outcomes? No No 
Note: dependent variable is the standardized composite test score; all columns report add
columns II and III refer to Table 3 column IV (panels a and b); columns IV–VI refer to 
* Signiﬁcance: 10%.
** Signiﬁcance: 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance: 1%.
Table A2
Artiﬁcial regression estimates for selected sub-samples.
Diff. grades Larger groups 
I II III 
Class size (log.) 0.01 0.01 0.02 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Peers age-grade gap (%) 0.01 0.00 0.01 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Peers low (%) 0.00 0.00 0.08**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Peers high (%) 0.05 0.04 0.08 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Bonus  Peers low (%) 0.03 0.02 0.01 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Bonus  Peers high (%) 0.00 0.02 0.08 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) foreign donors must be open to experiment in order to identify cost
effective policies.
Appendix A. Additional ﬁgures and tablesIII IV V VI
1.05 0.96 1.35 1.75
(0.72) (0.69) (1.14) (1.20)
3.88*** 4.19*** 3.32 2.74
(1.33) (1.38) (2.02) (2.12)
25.52*** 24.97*** 25.23*** 26.49***
(1.78) (1.74) (2.60) (2.73)
63.18*** 63.64*** 63.24*** 63.64***
(3.07) (3.10) (4.54) (4.51)
20.19*** 16.70*** 7.99 17.32*
(4.02) (3.76) (9.38) (9.77)
0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.17***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
0.23 0.33 1.08
(1.62) (2.07) (2.34)
3.45*** 1.77*** 4.13***
(0.55) (0.67) (0.95)
0.62 0.51 0.12
(0.82) (1.12) (1.16)
0.20 1.07 1.03
(1.69) (2.09) (2.32)
1.11 0.97 2.37
(0.82) (0.61) (1.45)
8.88*** 0.10 7.86***
(1.33) (1.68) (1.74)
0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.02)
0.21*** 0.12
(0.05) (0.10)
23.47*** 23.18***
(1.22) (1.63)
21.53*** 19.26***
(1.13) (1.47)
143,581 147,543 58,855 52,946
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FE FD FD FD
Yes No Yes Yes
Yes No No Yes
itional coefﬁcients from previous estimates; column I refers to column IV of Table 2;
column VI of the same tables; standard errors are clustered at the EA level.
Cent. and West. North. and East.
IV V VI VII VIII
0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
0.06 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
0.10* 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
0.09 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.05
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
TableA2 (Continued )
Diff. grades Larger groups Cent. and West. North. and East.
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
N 131,121 74,028 123,345 80,950 87,272 53,635 144,361 93,908
Symmetry 0.60 0.60 0.31 0.30 0.49 0.75 0.15 0.50
Speciﬁcation FE FD FE FD FE FD FE FD
Note: dependent variable is the estimated residual from column IV of Table 3, from which the speciﬁcation is also taken; FE indicates sibling ﬁxed effects; FD indicates sibling
differences; columns are restricted samples: columns I and II exclude sibs in the same grade; columns III and IV exclude peer observations taken from smaller samples; the
remaining columns are region-speciﬁc; only selected coefﬁcients shown; standard errors are clustered at the EA level.
* Signiﬁcance: 10%.
** Signiﬁcance: 5%.
***Signiﬁcance: 1%.
Table A3
Quantiﬁcation of test score contribution from high-achieving classmates under alternative policies.
Grade Pupils High Low Gain
k N NH NL Mean Total
(a) 1 80 40 40 5.0 400
2 80 40 40 5.0 400
(b) 1 120 40 80 2.2 267
2 40 40 0 20.0 800
Difference (b)(a): 1.7 267
Note: NH and NL are the number of high/low pupils in the class. Scenario (a) simulates automatic promotion; scenario (b) simulates grade retention of low-achievers. Mean
gain per grade is calculated as 20ðNH=NÞ2. ‘Difference’ encompasses both grades in each scenario.
20
40
60
80
10
0
Pe
rc
en
t
6 8 10 12 14 16
Age
Enrolled Age appropriate
Fig. A1. Enrolment and share of enrolled pupils who are age-appropriate, by age.
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Fig. A2. Share of classes, by grade, displaying a bimodal achievement proﬁle.
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